What next for Humanity and the World?

This entry is really going to be mostly a note - a work-in-progress, reflecting my recent research and interests, and responding to stimuli from various sources online. It may be necessary to follow this up with more detail, but I'm thinking of the content as a starting-point for discussion rather than a fixed view. So, please feel free to discuss...

Two related matters have come up recently which are related. The first is the shape of our future. This is a subject I have been informally researching for many years, and studying in more detail for the last eight years, off and on. Having spent much of this time exploring avenues of possibility focussed around climate change and global warming, more recently I have extended my study to include social, political, economic and ethical considerations.

Which leads neatly in to the second matter - the question of values, which has come up directly at Tobis's place, and is an ongoing personal fascination. I still maintain that unless we have a clear sense of the ethical foundations for action - what we want, or what we think is good for the future, then we cannot properly determine the optimal course of action. This is not to say that some actions are not already, in principle and in practical terms, evidently necessary, such as emissions reductions and environmental protection.

Back to the future (sic.): what do we expect the future to look like? A number of Futures Research groups have been exploring this question, some since the 1960's, more since the Club of Rome report in 1972. In addition, the themes and consequences of some of the possibilities have been extensively explored in literature, specifically in Science-Fiction, or speculative fiction writing, but also in recent literary fiction, such as David Mitchell's Cloud Atlas or more directly, John Brunner's 'Club of Rome Quartet'.

One such group, the Tellus Institute (With the Stockholm Environment Institute), has helpfully categorized future scenarios into three broad divisions, which I reference here simply because they resemble vaguely my own imagined scenarios; these are depicted below:

The group's emphasis is on the contrasts between the 'Conventional Worlds' (which elsewhere might be equated to 'BAU' scenarios for climate, for example) and the 'Great Transitions', which is characterised by: "...new socioeconomic arrangements and fundamental changes in values. They depict a transition to a society that preserves natural systems, provides high levels of welfare through material sufficiency and equitable distribution, and enjoys a strong sense of social solidarity. Population levels are stabilized at moderate levels and material flows through the economy are radically reduced through lower consumerism and massive use of green technologies..."

It may be worth noting here that the 'eco-communalism' pathway vaguely resembles the 'degrowth' meme which is currently fashionable.

The problem I have with these is that they are filled with good intentions but may be unrealisable - just a bit too idealistic and vague. The other problem with them, as with many other scenarios, is that they are strong on 'what we want', but weak on 'how we get there'. They also make presumptions about the values which lead us to see them as preferable objectives.

A third problem I have with the scenarios is that they deal more in what is possible (hypothetically) and desirable, than with what is likely.

During my study, I came across several pieces of speculative work from within the UK government framework, under the auspices of the Foresight projects. These are useful in that they are based as much as possible on evidence, they avoid exaggeration, and they are broadly pragmatic - in other words, they make sense to me.

<One such report, headed by the Government's Chief Scientist, from 2011, is about global migration in relation to climate change. In the contect of their work, the group produced a scenarios outline which covers the major drivers of migration and their relative significance, as well as outlining plausible world-views out to 2060. Why do I say plausible? Because they are, where available, derived from other, important, credible and well-researched sources, such as the IPCC, WHO and UNEP, and because they avoid both pre-evaluation (there's no discusion of 'better' or 'worse' futures) and they are not unduly alarmist (which is not to say they are not alarming in some ways).

I also present them here as a backdrop, because I think they find a useful balance between several factors which are consistently discussed on the blogs I frequent, and in the Guardian, for example.  The scenarios are described in detail here, the report itself is here.

In our extended discussion on Natural Capital (is it a good idea?), here, in relation to how we place a value on Nature, or move beyond concepts such as Sustainability, which appears to have been completely redefined by Corporate and Political interests to mean almost the opposite of what it  was originally supposed to mean, MT expresses the wish: "..

My wild hope is to join or nucleate some conversation that would come to some well-thought-out alternative...(to a Natural Capital  agenda)"

Some time ago, I suggested that 'Resourcefulness' might function as a better criterion, but I now believe that this is too close conceptually to the problem that 'Natural Capital' raises, the evaluation of the natural world in terms of its pure utility to humans (though it might avoid the purely econometric issue of putting a price on nature).

In response to the various scenarios of possible world futures and the problem of balancing the relative values placed on the drivers of change, I am currently suggesting that the world we are heading closer to is somewhat closer to the Tellus Institute's 'Fortress Worlds' scenario, though with significant differences. Broadly, I see a world more divided, not more integrated, with greater inequities, but with distinctive geophysical boundaries defining the disconnects between the largely Urbanised and progressive 'modern civilization', the largely agrarian  and protected 'supply zones', rural environments with connections to the urban, and the 'lost places', wastelands where social, political, environmental and ecological damage has resulted in insufficiently productive, isolated and borderline uninhabitable zones, occupied by a sub-underclass of humanity fighting for survival; in other words, a world a bit like ours, but more so, with the differences exaggerated rather than ameliorated. One such imagined world is described in David Wingrove's Chung Kuo series of books, though climate change is not incorporated as a factor. Though it diverges from my own vision, it contains some useful speculations and themes in the early volumes which make it worth exploring.

One main reason for imagining this kind of future scenario is a concept which undoubtedly exists in the literature but which I have not yet seen described, which is that of the inherent inertia of the Global Society, generated by the presence and influence of institutions (governments), corporations, economy and markets, habits, apathy, caution, and history. In other words, I think that, in spite of our best intentions, it is most likely that change are going to come relatively slowly (unless there is a Force Majeure which intervenes), too slowly for some people and parts of the world, and that a complete breakdown into a Fortress World scenario is improbable (though not impossible).

Furthermore, I fear that we have already passed the stage (in relation to development over then next 50 years) where we can hope for anything much better than this; the same inertia which is likely to mean avoiding total annihilation is also likely to result in irreversible changes, desertification, drought, regional famine, political instability, local wars, etc., which will leave a residue of inequity and damage for the generations beyond to address.

This then has already gone beyond an idea of what sort of world we want, to a speculation about what sort of world we are likely to end up in. Which is where the challenges, questions and arguments might begin. Is this a vision you believe is plausible, or do you see things differently? Is this the kind of inheritance we would wish for? Is there anything we can do to reduce the inequities, damage and risks? Can we do better, realistically, given the timeframe and the problem of inertia? Is my vision too conservative in your eyes, or too radical? 

I'd really enjoy feedback if this has stimulated your imagination. As for Michael's wish for a new pathway to get us beyond sustainability - well, if we can work out what we want and what we expect, we can start to defines a value (or set of values) which will help get us somewhere a little better... 

The COP-out; what a catalyst you turned out to be...

What is to be learned from the fiasco that is currently COP19? 

First, it appears that there is a sea-change in the rhetoric of certain developed nations. Where previously there had been some attempt to avoid being seen as a moral pariah, the examples of Australia, Canada, hosts Poland and other participants, show that the fear of domestic political damage is overriding the fear of international shame in responses to both mitigation and adaptation needs. Some folks are just flat out saying that they ain't gonna do nuthin' for mitigation, on the contrary, intend to follow domestic policies which run counter not just to climate change M&A but also pretty much all concepts of Sustainable Development. 

Their response indicates that rather than address the hugely complex ethical and practical difficulties of coping with Sustainability on a global as well as domestic scale, these players prefer to deny any relationship to responsibility past present or future, and express the intent to go down the short-term self-interested path. As a former teacher, this is reminiscent of certain schools which proclaim that 'bullying is nonexistent'. There is no such thing as an adolescent society devoid of an internal power/influence structure; it just takes subtly different forms. But in all (secondary) schools there are those who dominate and those who are dominated. Likewise, it is fair to say that there is no society which will escape the negative consequences of AGW down-the-line, and these players, in denying the reality, are simply deferring the problem to a period beyond their tenure (or even lifetime).

Second, the divide between have and have-not seems to be crystallising. Not just the rhetoric, but also the desires and intentions of the G20 (for example), are in conflict with those of the G77. One one side, the demand is: "you caused this problem, you ought to help fix it," on the other: "it isn't OUR problem, why should we?" 

It's difficult to be sure how this divide will develop over time, but the choices seem to be starkly twofold: 
1: Either we move towards a global society which is increasingly polarised on the basis of wealth (capacity to adapt), increasingly inequitable and unjust, and increasingly violent (what happens at metropolitan level when you have a strongly financially divided society?), in which scenarios of multiple-million deaths and permanent local/regional instability become the accepted 'necessary cost' (Collateral damage, anyone?), or 
2: We continue to struggle towards a generally more equitable and just society, where the distribution of the means of survival are managed and shared, according to the need of the recipient and the ability of the provider (Charity, anyone?), ie, seeking the win-win solution. (Yes, it can be argued that Australia is playing a particular variant of the zero-sum game, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and is opting to 'win' at the cost of the other).

The third (and probably most divisive) lesson is that Climate negotiations are going down an inexorable path to a blame-culture. This can be nothing but bad news. It's as if the developing nations ('victims') have decided that, since the 'noisy neighbours' won't play ball, they are going to proceed to litigation and counter-attack to achieve their objectives, in response to which the neighbours send out the rottweilers. This is very much a no-win game.

On the brighter side, I have a suggestion as to How to ensure that funds exist for fixing what's been broke, protecting what's at risk, and preparing for the unexpected.

The parallel is not exact, but more than 300 years ago, the largest need for investment, and the largest return on investment, came through international trade, conducted over the high seas. In response to market demand, and from pre-existing processes, Lloyd's of London was formed, to provide investors with greater security, and sailors with funds needed to set sail. Why can't we construct a similar organisation for Global Environmental (incl. climate) Capital? Existing entities such as the World Bank and the IMF, funds such as CCC or the corporate sustainability foundation trusts, can band together, with or without individual governments, as 'names', providing the capital to allow for underwriting of risks, for investment in M&A strategies, and for providing succour to the victims of disaster. This way, more would share the burdens, autonomy could be preserved, and what was needed could be provided where and when the need arose.

It's a thought.

More out than in - outside physics, is it possible?

Yesterday in the Guardian, Tim Smedley reports on the forthcoming forum on Natural Capital Accounting. Link to the article here. 

It's an interesting feature, not least for the comments which follow it, which are clearly considered and sophisticated (so far!). Included among which is the response from the group setting up a 'counter forum, in the same city, Edinburgh, at the same time; 'Nature is not for sale'.

Lord Aaron's comment in the feed at the bottom of the article brings up one of the more significant problems in the area of Natural Capital Accounting: that it is placing a financial price on Natural Capital (the article cites the groundbreaking work done by Puma since 2010), and thereby making Nature marketable (in other words, natural assets can be traded, and 'environmental offsets' can become tradeable capital resources. If this were the direction that NCA goes into, it's easy to see that the Environment is likely to lose out again to vested interested/creative accounting, where it substitutes for accountability.

But it seems also that NCA can have a role to play. As the article shows, it becomes possible to place a relative price and cost against a return from exploitation. This in turn allows us to see where resources are being exploited rather than used Resourcefully- in other words, more is lost in the transition from the prime resource to the tradeable commodity, or product, than is gained in the short term. You can see where this could be of benefit, not just to the Corporates who now appear to be recognising that unsustainable exploitation means precisely that they cannot sustain, even in the mid-term, the end product which is the basis of their capital wealth and added value. And losing their core supply, even shifting the balance of Demand/supply, will hurt their businesses moving forward.

For a long time now, Many Environmentalists have been deeply suspicious of moves to subsume the World's natural resources into a discussion of Economy, of 'putting a price on Nature'. What the argument has often boiled down to is that the Value of a Natural Resource lies in more than the dollar signs against it - the price. And this in turn is driven by a division in the ways in which people view Nature and the World: whether it is something for us humans to use (you could call this the 'Genesis' perception), or is something to which we belong and for which we, as the species which can damage it, or unbalance it, have a duty of care (the 'Stewardship perception).

All of which relates to the principle of Resourcefulness. In particular, it serves to demonstrate why Resourcefulness must be about more than resources. It is good that someone is working hard to challenge the implicit presumptions or potential hazards embedded within Natural Capital Accounting, but sadly, for the organisation involved, the brute reality is that, whilst it can be argued that Nature should not be for sale, in fact, as a basis of the means of production, it is.

There is a temporal perspective to be considered here in relation to these matters - for climate debaters, the principle of 'trash now, pay later' is one of the monsters being strongly fought, consistently. Scientists try to tell politicians and the public what they are letting themselves in for, and then get berated for 'alarmism', because narrow focussed eyes don't look far enough down the line to account for the consequences of choosing net present profit over projected loss.

There is also a philosophical/existential principle, but this is a little harder to summarise briefly, so will have to wait for another post. It is about what it means to be human, in the World, with Others, and also about the concept of 'home' and its significance to us.

A parting thought. A while back, someone might have realised that Dodo represented a potentially valuable commodity as a foodstuff, like turkeys, for example, but to make it so, the supply chain would have needed preserving. Hungry sailors didn't tend to think that way.